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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation 
and Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
 
 
In recent years, the Mediterranean has been a hot topic in international gas markets. 
The latest natural gas findings in Eastern Mediterranean, according to many analysts, 
have the potential to transform the region and global energy markets. The 
transformation of Eastern Mediterranean to a natural gas province will inevitably alter 
the geopolitical landscape, thus creating new opportunities and challenges for each 
player in the region. Local economies can reap big economic benefits, once gas 
become commercial. Regional players from their part should strengthen the energy 
cooperation, which can also pave the way for a new era of economic and political 
stability in the Mediterranean. The aim of this thesis will be to provide a 
comprehensive overview on the natural gas markets and recent developments in the 
Mediterranean region; and to propose a critical discussion of the gas market 
opportunities and geopolitical risks related to the potential emergence of a 
Mediterranean natural gas hub.    
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Introduction 
     In recent years, the Mediterranean has been a hot topic in international gas 
markets. The latest natural gas findings in Eastern Mediterranean, according to many 
analysts, have the potential to transform the region and global energy markets. The 
transformation of Eastern Mediterranean to a natural gas province will inevitably alter 
the geopolitical landscape, thus creating new opportunities and challenges for each 
player in the region. The aim of this thesis will be to provide a comprehensive overview 
on the natural gas markets and recent developments in the Mediterranean region; and 
to propose a critical discussion of the gas market opportunities and geopolitical risks 
related to the potential emergence of a Mediterranean natural gas hub.  
     This thesis will comprise three main sections. The first section will refer to the 
fundamentals of gas economics such as production costs, peculiarities of gas; and 
prices formula and contracts; and the supply and demand trends for Mediterranean 
countries. The second section will concentrate on the infrastructure trends and 
developments in the Mediterranean. The last section will focus on the geopolitical 
context of the Mediterranean and the opportunities and challenges that arise when 
dealing with the creation of a natural gas hub in the Mediterranean.   
     The countries of the Mediterranean and their neighbors are even more unstable 
today than even before. The political transition in Egypt, the civil war in Syria, the 
tensions between Israel and Gaza, the political unrest in Libya, the future of Turkey 
and the dispute between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus impede the creation of a 
reliable natural gas hub in the region. The creation of a Mediterranean gas hub would 
present great benefits for all players in the region strategically and economically. Until 
now, “proposals for pipelines and LNG schemes have emerged, they all face problems 
related to economics or international relations—or both.” Furthermore, “there are 
other substantial hurdles to overcome, including lack of pricing transparency, as well 
as market culture and attitude to gas trading” (Tagliapietra, 2013).   
     Albeit commercial appeal, the creation of an integrated Mediterranean gas hub will 
depend not only on foreign policy considerations but, also, on domestic policies. “Even 
in Israel, investors have faced difficulties. Energy security is a sensitive topic in a 
country that sees itself as a politically isolated in the region. Many Israelis are uneasy 
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about the country exporting its natural wealth.” (Nakhle, 2016) As for Egypt, the 
government’s policy to divert natural gas supply for exports to meet demand, the low 
prices that the government is willing to pay to foreign operators and the inability of 
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGCP) to pay off its debts to foreign 
operators led to investment delays and accelerate investors’ anxiety (EIA, 2015). 
Except of the abovementioned, “the declining oil and gas prices has amplified the 
difficulties in the region and brought into question whether developing the fields is 
commercially viable.” (Nakhle, 2016)   
     “The politics and economics of Mediterranean energy are rapidly changing. The 
resources could reshape local domestic economies, frame regional geopolitics and 
provide an alternative source of gas to Europe, reducing its dependence on Russia” 
(Nakhle, 2016).  Local economies can reap big economic benefits, once gas become 
commercial. Regional players from their part should strengthen energy cooperation, 
which can also pave the way for a new era of economic and political stability in the 
Mediterranean.   
     The combined resources of Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Libya advocate the creation of 
a natural gas hub in the Mediterranean. For the creation of a gas hub in the 
Mediterranean, establishment of a robust interconnection system, LNG terminals and 
storage facilities are a prerequisite. But considering the capital intensity of such 
infrastructure projects, the current pricing and the political dynamics in the region 
create serious challenges for such immense investments. Therefore, Mediterranean 
countries should engage diplomatically and cooperate towards the creation of the 
appropriate infrastructure. For instance, the strategic alignment between Cyprus, 
Greece and Israel represents a new element in the regional geopolitical landscape. On 
the other hand, “absent of collaborative vision could represent a potential element of 
destabilization in the region and, also, a source of new tensions” (Tagliapietra, 2013).  
     “Gas trade in the Mediterranean is greatly unbalanced, with some countries 
becoming major exporters (mainly Algeria, Libya and Egypt) and others major 
importers (both the North and South Mediterranean sub-regions in addition to 
Turkey).” (Martinez et al., 2013) Egypt, once a major gas producer, is struggling the last 
years with energy shortages, on the other hand, in some countries such as Cyprus and 
Lebanon there is an absence of natural gas from their energy mix, since they rely 
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heavily on oil products. A fact that constitutes a great economic burden for these 
countries, which are used to pay hefty import bills. Therefore, there is a great 
possibility for natural gas as an indigenous produced resource to gain significant 
market share in the future.  
     For Cyprus and Israel, the construction of export infrastructure and the 
development of their fields is a crucial problem. Several options for gas export were 
proposed, from pipelines to Greece or Turkey, and LNG projects in Cyprus, Egypt or 
Israel. Recently, Israel, Greece and Cyprus announced that they will explore the 
possibility of building a joint natural gas pipeline to Europe. However, the specific 
project runs into technical difficulties due to the seabed between Cyprus and the 
Greek coast; and very high costs. Compared to offshore pipelines, the most prominent 
and sensible option is to bring Israeli and Cypriot gas to the Egyptian LNG Terminals. 
According to Tagliapietra and Zachmann (2013) “Egypt’s LNG exports dropped from a 
starting level of about 15 bcm/y in 2005 to almost zero in 2014, leaving the country’s 
two LNG plants completely idle.” In addition, the proximity of the three fields Zohr, 
Aphrodite and Leviathan, allows the development of the fields to be coordinated. This 
solution minimizes political and especially commercial risk, for instance if the field 
underperforms. “Consequently, bringing together an underused and scalable export 
infrastructure with several promising fields could be the key to unlock untapped 
regional potential.” (Tagliapietra & Zachmann, 2013)   
     Although, there is a high level of uncertainty about the role of natural gas in the 
future EU energy mix, the European Union has a primary interest on the Eastern 
Mediterranean natural gas development, as natural gas is projected to become the 
predominant fuel in the European energy mix. On the other hand, there is a gloomy 
picture for the years ahead as there is a gas market crisis, underinvestment on gas 
infrastructure, and the uncertainty regarding the “contradictual” energy policies of the 
EU. The Roadmap 2050 strengthens this speculation, since there is a great incentive 
toward the decarbonization of the European economy and the role of gas is projected 
less important in the following years, which is considered as a “transition energy”. 
Therefore, it is very normal to have different projection on future EU natural gas 
demand. Some projections show an increasing gas demand, while others show a 
declining gas demand.   
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     Regarding the methodology, as a primary source this study will use the official 
documents and statistical of IEA/ EIA/governments, the statements and speeches of 
statesmen and official representatives of official materials and documents 
(statements, news releases etc.), information and analytical resources of the official 
websites of international organizations, national energy ministries. In addition, 
secondary sources will be used in this study which is reflected in the literature review. 
The purpose of this thesis is a combination of description and explanation. This thesis 
will endeavor to examine and answer questions such as 1) A Mediterranean gas hub: is 
it a dream or a necessity if we take into consideration the current supply & demand 
database and the gas economics?; 3) Infrastructure: what role do they play in the 
pursuit of a Mediterranean gas hub?; 4) Which is the role of geopolitics in the pursuit 
of a gas hub in the region and which are the opportunities and obstacles that arise? 
This thesis will be of great significance, as long as natural gas continues to play an 
important role in ensuring our energy needs. Natural gas is a rising star, that is 
considered to play a crucial role in tomorrow’s energy mix along with renewables.  
     Natural gas is a low-cost energy source with huge unexploited and easily accessible 
reserves worldwide. In addition, it produces half of the carbon emissions of coal. If we 
considered that yet a large percentage of electricity today is generated by coal-fired 
power plants, natural gas has the opportunity to replace coal successfully, since it is 
the fastest, most efficient and least expensive way to reduce CO2 emissions, and on 
the other hand provides a sustainable response to rising global energy demand. In 
other words, the natural gas can provide backup to renewables when there is no 
sunlight or wind, or consumption peaks.      
     Therefore, natural gas has the potential to dominate the global energy mix, 
especially after the imposition of price on carbon, a fact that will make the natural gas 
more competitive in relation to coal, which benefits from its low prices and the lack of 
regulatory restrictions on emissions. The creation of a Mediterranean hub can 
contribute effectively to energy security of the region, enhance the liquidity of the 
market and improve competitiveness of gas vis-à-vis coal.   
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Fundamentals of Natural Gas 
     Natural gas is the fastest growing energy source in the world. Although natural gas 
has been known since ancient times, the industry has been marked by high growth in 
the late 1980s-early 1990s when environmental concerns moved to the forefront of 
international policy agendas. Especially the last decades, when energy supply security 
concerns were raised, the attention on natural gas increased due to its high demand 
and more concentrated distribution of reserves. Natural gas “has taken on an ever-
greater role in the world’s energy mix, growing from 16% to over 21% of total primary 
energy supply in the period since the IEA was created.” (IEA, 2014) In its short history, 
the gas industry has undergone significant changes due to developments in terms of 
market structure, technological advances, as well as economic and political 
dimensions. According to many analysts, natural gas has the potential to dominate the 
global energy mix, especially after the imposition of price on carbon, a fact that will 
make the natural gas more competitive in relation to coal, which benefits from its low 
prices and the lack of regulatory restrictions on emissions. Due to the current general 
political instability and the insecurity that gives to the pipelines, LNG is a resilient way 
of delivering mobile gas, that can provide the fuel to a greater number of markets 
(Saleem, 2014) and especially distant markets, whose access through pipelines is 
uneconomical and not commercially-viable.  
      Today, natural gas is the one of the world’s most actively traded commodity, and as 
other commodities its price experiences wide price swings in times of shortage or 
oversupply. The birth of the gas market is relatively new, and it started in 1980s with 
the first move of natural gas market liberalization in UK and US. Generally, there are 
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two different markets for gas: the physical gas market and the financial gas market. 
The physical gas market is the typical market, which involves buyers and sellers of a 
physical commodity. There are many types of physical trading contracts such as base 
load contracts, firm contracts and swing contracts. On the other hand, regarding the 
financial gas market we have the future market, where commodities are purchased or 
sold under contracts at least one month, and up 36 months.    
Production Costs 
     The gas industry consists of many technically demanding and capital intensive 
functional activities. “These include production, gathering, storage, pipeline 
transportation, distribution and supply to end-users” (Julius & Mashayekhi, 1990). 
Natural gas production involves a set of operations, which are exploration, drilling and 
production. The gas industry needs to incur a set of costs, which is known as “full cycle 
costs”, in order to find, develop, produce and sustain production of gas; which in most 
cases are fixed and risky due to the technical nature of exploration and development.  
      The costs of an exploration and development company start from the very first 
phase of the exploration, which is considered as a process that involves high risks and 
significant costs even for areas of good geological prospect. These costs increase with 
the level of sophistication of the exploratory surveys. “Generally, the least-cost option 
is used most widely and the costliest option is used most selectively.  Gas exploration 
follows the same methods and techniques used for oil; and often gas is found while 
searching for oil.” (Bhattacharyya, 2011) The main target of any exploration program is 
to achieve the maximum discovery at the minimum cost. These costs, known as finding 
costs that a company must cover, are the cost of geological and geophysical work, 
licensing rounds, signature bonuses and the costs of drilling exploration wells.  
      Once the discovery is made the next stage is to decide whether to develop the field 
or not. The final decision is based largely on the size of the discovery. Other issues are 
proximity to the market, availability of viable consumers etc. Similarly, development of 
fields and production are also costly activities. Development cost depends on the 
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number of wells to be developed, well locations, reservoir condition and the surface 
infrastructure required (Julius & Mashayekhi, 1990).  
      Production costs also known as lifting costs, generally, are the costs that natural gas 
industry needs to incur in order to operate and maintain wells and support equipment 
or facilities. Additionally, economic rents through taxes levied by the government or 
loyalty systems are also considered as production costs.  
     The rate of recovery of natural gas tends to be better than oil, and the output from 
a field is determined by the number and technology sophistication of wells 
development. “But once peak is reached and depletion starts, it is more difficult to 
improve production. Enhanced recovery of gas is complicated and expensive” 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011).   
      If natural gas prices are above these full cycle costs, the industry has an incentive to 
sustain investment and activity in the sector, since upstream companies emphasize 
generally production volume in order to generate profit margins, which are sensitive to 
commodities market prices. But, the fluctuations in natural gas commodity price can 
cause volatility in company’s cash flow and if prices are squeezed for prolonged 
periods, the industry may decide to lower or postpone capital spending, production 
and reserve replacement (EIA, 2016).   
 
Natural Gas Demand 
     The recent low natural gas prices indicate that the demand for natural gas has not 
grown as rapidly as the growth in supplies. However, many analysts believe that in the 
future natural gas will play a key role as an energy source, and they point out that low 
natural gas prices will lead to a substantial growth, mainly in the electric and industrial 
sectors. As regards the electricity sector, due to low prices and globally emerging 
environmental regulations; natural gas-fired generation capacity is expected to replace 
a significant portion of the old coal-fired generation, thus leading to an increase in 
natural gas demand in the electric sector.  
      However, new strategies and environmental policies put in place in Europe and in 
other regions, they do not offer a clear view of future natural gas demand, thus it 
depends on the future electricity generation mix.  The demand for natural gas 
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Picture 1: Gas demand by region and scenario, Source: OME  
correlates closely with general economic growths. The occurrence of recessions or 
economic slowdowns, like the one that occurred in China recently, has a direct impact 
on demand for gas. During periods of economic growth, the increased demand for 
goods and services from the industrial and commercial sectors leads to an increase in 
natural gas demand. In contrast, economic downturns tend to have the opposite 
effect. Since energy demand is affected by the level of economic activity, it should also 
be influenced by interest rates and policy decisions that determine natural gas demand 
(EIA, 2016).   
      Another reason that could lead to the decrease of demand is that due to concerns 
over climate change. A number of countries have adopted a regulation to reduce CO2 
emissions and to shift their energy mix from fossil fuels to renewables. Furthermore, 
weather strongly influences residential and commercial demand. During winter, end 
users consume natural gas excessively for heating, which consequently increases 
demand. Hot weather can also generate demand for air-conditioning and subsequently 
power sector’s demand for natural gas. Natural gas supplies that were placed in 
storage are crucial because they satisfy peak demand; and help to avoid shortages and 
short-term price spikes. Finally, some large-volume fuel consumers have the ability to 
switch to other fuels than natural gas depending on the price of each fuel. Therefore, 
when the cost of competent energy sources decrease, demand for natural gas may fell 
as well and the opposite.   
 
    Although, natural gas 
demand is projected to 
grow significantly in the 
near future, there are no 
clear estimations in the 
longer term. This is mainly                 
the result of the highly 
competitive market between 
gas and other alternative energy sources such as coal, nuclear and renewables. Thus, 
“the cost competitiveness of gas will be a key determinant of the outlook beyond 
2020. The price needs to be low enough to sustain and improve the share of natural 
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gas in total primary energy consumption, but high enough to encourage investment in 
new gas supply.” (Office of the Chief Economist, Australia Government 2015) For 
instance, as regards the electricity sector, gas is being squeezed between low cost coal 
and the growth of renewables that pose a risk at the expected “golden age of gas”.   
     In the short term, prices for the majority of commodities like oil or gas are projected 
to remain well below their peaks as market, in the same time, struggles to adjust to a 
period of growing output but lower demand growth. Since even in the case of a 
stronger world economic growth, it is unlikely to stimulate a demand-driven recovery. 
However, any increase in commodity prices in the future, it is more likely to be related 
with cut in supply as many producers with high break-even prices exit the market or 
curtail production.   
 
Natural Gas Peculiarities 
     Natural gas production in order to be increased and sustained, needs long lead 
times compared to other products due to the time required for acquiring leases and 
government permits; conducting exploratory seismic work; drilling wells; and 
connecting them to pipelines. Therefore, it takes time from minimum six months to 
years for producers to develop wells, produce natural gas and adjust their supplies 
according to demand and commodity prices.  
     Unlike other fuels, natural gas cannot simply be loaded on a ship or train for 
transportation from wells to consumer markets. In contrast, natural gas transportation 
requires a costly and complex system of pipelines or “complicated conversion systems 
that either cool the gas into liquid form, compress the gas to higher pressures, or 
modify its chemical composition to allow conversion to other products.” (Chandra, 
2006) However, technological advances and decreasing costs especially for LNG 
projects have allowed gas to economically the above-mentioned challenges and 
enhance its possibilities of becoming the fuel of the future.   
Price Formula 
     For many years, natural gas and oil were considered as close substitutes by using 
whichever energy source was less expensive and due to that fact natural gas prices 
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aligned with those of crude oil (Brown & Yucel, 2008). Additionally, the cost escalation 
at new projects made imperative for investors to prefer long-term contracts at 
traditional, oil-indexed prices. The Long-Term Contracts, an outcome of lengthy 
negotiations between counter-parts, “establish long-term commitments by consumers 
to purchase minimal volumes of gas and they also ensured a reliable stream of income 
to ensure that large investments could be financed” (Vavilov, 2015), but after the 
development of the spot market, this type of contracts became unattractive and not 
competitive enough. In recent years, due to the development of the spot market and 
other changes related to supply and demand, provisions of long-term contracts have 
undergone substantial changes because of their lack of flexibility. The long timeframe 
of that contracts and especially the famous clause “take or pay”, made long-term 
contracts unattractive, since they were considered to pass the risk from the sellers to 
buyers. Additionally, bilateral gas contracts are against the basic rules of a competitive 
gas market. In a competitive gas market, the interaction of supply and demand 
determines the movement of prices and in the absence of such a market; it is 
extremely hard to determine the price of natural gas. Therefore, in long-term contracts 
they use traditionally the oil market price as a benchmark for contract gas pricing. “The 
absence of a gas market, both global and even regional, led to rigidity, and a bias in the 
distribution of gains from trade between seller and buyer that favored the seller. This 
bias was based on the essential role of power levers in bilateral gas deals. However, 
recent developments in the market such as the drop-in oil prices and the convergence 
of LNG and regional natural gas prices since late 2014 are leading the trend away from 
oil-indexed prices and emphasizing weather and technological advancements as key 
drivers of natural gas prices.”  (Global Natural Gas Markets Overview: A Report 
Prepared by Leidos, Inc., Under Contract to EIA, 2014) 
     Generally, there are two simple rules of thumb for natural gas oil-indexed pricing. 
The first rule is the 10-to-1 rule, under which the natural gas price is one-tenth the 
price of crude oil price. The second simple rule is the 6-to-1 rule and is based on the 
energy content of a barrel of oil. For instance, a barrel of WTI contains 5.825 million 
Btu, therefore natural gas price ought to be roughly one-sixth the crude oil price.  
However, according to previous researches neither the 10-to-1 nor the 6-to-1 rule 
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perform well, since the first one consistently under forecasts natural gas prices and the 
second one over-forecasts (Brown & Yucel, 2008).  
     On the other hand, spot market developed rapidly and increased its position 
significantly compared to long-term contracts. The main characteristic of spot market 
is that inside it gas is traded “right now” at a price based on fundamentals (supply & 
demand). Spot market is part of the physical market and offers flexibility to all 
participants that have the ability to sell or buy gas according to their needs at that 
specific time. The spot markets for natural gas is separated in the Day Ahead, Intraday 
and the balancing market. The evolution of the gas spot market led to an LNG growth 
globally, since the participants became able to trade gas on a daily basis.  With the 
recognition of the importance of natural gas supply security and the increased 
importance of natural gas in the energy mix, various countries attempted to create 
their natural gas hubs. To be more specific, gas hubs are trading platforms where 
supply meets demand in order for the prices to be set by the logic of markets; and 
where physical and/or financial transactions of natural gas take place. Although, gas 
hubs were related mainly to pipelines, initiatives by various countries to develop LNG 
hubs, such as Singapore and Japan, changed the situation. The creation of LNG hubs 
will enable participants to trade LNG at reasonable prices and have access to a great 
number of suppliers or consumers at any time; thus, it will enhance also the security of 
supply.  
    The low oil and gas prices make the gas more competitive and attractive to the 
consumers. However, the high price volatility poses a high risk to future projects and 
investors, since it makes financial planning and expectations challenging if the prices 
for gas go further down. Additionally, many of the countries endowed with gas 
resources lack a well-developed legal system, a fact that exposes operations in their 
soil to an increased risk of unpredictable actions by the governments in the future. 
Finally, the inherent risks of gas operations and human error that could cause an 
accident and an environmental event, is one of the main threats. This threat except of 
the negative effect that will have for the environment, it would also tarnish a 
company’s reputation and subject the company to sanctions and penalties.    
     “The establishment of price indices which accurately reflect the supply and demand 
of LNG itself will not only facilitate spot trading but also contribute to stabilizing import 
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prices through immediately helping to diversify price formulae, which used to be 
mainly linked to crude oil prices.” (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
Government of Japan, 2016) Therefore, the participation of financial service providers 
or other risk takers in the market is crucial for the facilitation and development of the 
future markets as well as the increase of the depth of the LNG market. The 
development and promotion of spot trading will facilitate the establishment of gas 
price indices which reflect the supply and demand of LNG itself- and enhance their 
reliability. This change will also lead to a ship from long-term contracts at oil-indexed 
prices to a new system linked to natural gas hub pricing based on supply and demand 
trends. Additionally, it is expected that “the need for price hedging utilizing futures 
trading will further increase and this will facilitate the establishment of relevant price 
indices through the transmission of futures prices.” (Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry Government of Japan, 2016) In order for LNG trading to continue to grow it is 
important to encourage new market players to participate and to develop the 
adequate infrastructure. As regards the infrastructure, that maybe will be a difficult 
task since LNG infrastructure is capital intensive and its development until now based 
on long-term commitments. Therefore, it is clear that the global gas market should 
develop a liquidity and hub-based structure that will be transparent and will ensure 
fair access to all participants without discrimination.  
     To conclude, natural gas prices are mainly a function of market supply and demand 
and changes over a short period may result in large price changes. Factors on the 
supply side that can determine prices include levels of natural gas production, levels of 
net imports, and levels of underground storage. On the demand side, there are three 
aspects that can affect prices of natural gas: the level of economic growth, variations in 
winter and summer weather and prices of competing fuels-petroleum prices. 
Generally, price spikes lead to increases in production, imports, and sales from storage 
inventories.   
 
Production and Consumption Trends in the Mediterranean  
     “Gas trade in the Mediterranean is greatly unbalanced, with some countries 
becoming major exporters (mainly Algeria, Libya and Egypt) and others major 
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importers (both the North and South Mediterranean sub-regions in addition to 
Turkey).” (Martinez et al., 2013) Egypt is struggling the last years with energy 
shortages additionally, in some countries such as Albania, Cyprus and Lebanon there is 
an absence of natural gas from their energy mix, since they rely almost entirely on oil 
products. A fact that constitutes a great economic burden for these countries, which 
are used to pay hefty import bills. Therefore, there is a great possibility for natural gas 
as an indigenous produced resource to gain significant market share in the future. 
          Although oil traditionally had the highest production levels in the region; future 
projections display that production of oil is expected to increase at lower rates giving 
priority to other sources such as natural gas and renewables, especially after the 
recent discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. The discoveries in the region 
are relatively insignificant on a global scale, but they can transform the future of the 
countries in the Eastern Mediterranean; and can provide those countries with high 
economic returns and enhance energy security for years.  
     Egypt is a traditional natural gas producer that was self-reliant until 2015, when 
started importing gas in order to meet its subsidized demand (Ratner, 2015). Syria and 
Israel do also hold significant gas reserves, but those sectors were not developed 
commercially until the 1980s and the mid-2000s respectively. Jordan had also some 
natural gas production at low levels since 1980s, which was insufficient to meet 
domestic demand. Jordan mainly relies on imports until now. 
     Egypt although it was traditionally a large producer of natural gas, it became a net 
importer in 2015 and is still facing a natural gas shortage, primarily because of 
government policies to subsidize domestic consumption and to give low payments to 
foreign operators. These domestic policies hurt natural gas producers and curbed their 
interest in developing new natural gas resources, since they were forced by the 
government to sell a percentage of their production domestically at lower than 
international prices. Additionally, Egyptian government’s mounting debt to foreign 
energy companies in combination with political unrest after the Arab Spring had as a 
result a drop of 27% of the Egyptian natural gas production between 2009 and 2015, 
while the demand rose rapidly.   
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Table 1: Egypt’s natural gas production and domestic supply, Source: IEA 
       
     Due to that rapid increase in demand, Egypt forced to divert its natural gas supply 
from exports to the domestic market and began importing LNG in 2015. However, 
Egypt’s situation is expected to change in the future mainly after the utilization of the 
supergiant Zohr Field, which was discovered by Eni SpA in August 2015. Until now, the 
Zohr Field is the largest discovery in the Eastern Mediterranean and holds up to 30 Tcf. 
     In Israel, Noble’s discoveries Noa Field (1999), Dalit and Tamar (2009), Leviathan 
(2010) and Tanin (2011) confirmed the presence of natural gas in the country. Until 
now, the largest offshore discovery in the country is the Leviathan Field, “located 
approximately 80 miles off the cost of Israel and situated in water that is more than 
5,000 feet deep- which holds 18 Tcf in estimated recoverable resources.” (EIA, 2013) 
Production from the Tamar Field started in April 2013, and production from the 
Leviathan Field is scheduled to begin as soon as in 2019.  
     In addition to the discoveries in Israel, Noble Energy discovered the Aphrodite Field 
offshore of Cyprus in 2011 that was estimated to hold between 5 and 8 trillion cubic 
feet (Tfc) of natural gas reserves (Oil Daily, 2012). Although, government officials hope 
to discover between 30 and 40 Tcf of additional natural gas resources and plan to 
develop the Aphrodite field and begin exporting gas by 2019, Cyprus does not have the 
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necessary infrastructure; a fact that makes it difficult and costly for the country to 
utilize gas for exports or even for domestic use.  
    The successful discoveries in the region spurred additional exploration. Syria and 
Lebanon hoped to launch exploration program, however, the civil war and the political 
stalemate accordingly postponed these programs.  
    Syria was previously considered a leading hydrocarbon producer in Eastern 
Mediterranean with a production of 316 Mcf per day (EIA, 2015). However, country’s 
natural gas production declined dramatically to less than 200 Bcf in 2013 (EIA, 2015) 
due to the ongoing civil war that created serious damages or completely destroyed 
natural gas infrastructure.  
 
Table 2: Syria’s natural gas production and domestic supply, Source: IEA 
       
     In the north-African part of Mediterranean, Algeria holds the world’s eleventh-
largest amount of proved natural gas reserves, according to Oil & Gas Journal the 
country had 159 Tcf of proved natural gas reserves. However, its production has 
steadily declined over the last years as its largest, mature field is depleting since its 
peak of 7.1 Tcf in 2008 (EIA, 2016). In 2014, Algeria’s dry natural gas production was 
3.0 Tcf of which 1.5 Tcf was exported via pipelines (910 Bcf) and by LNG tankers (578 
Bcf) (EIA, 2016). The country’s government officials announced several projects 
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planned to come online in order to increase production levels, but all of them have 
been delayed. 
 
Table 3: Algeria’s natural gas production and exports, Source: IEA 
      
     Libya is a member of the OPEC and the fifth-largest holder of Africa’s proved natural 
gas reserves that were estimated as 53 Tcf. However, although its vast reserves, 
Libya’s oil and gas production have been significantly affected by the civil unrest since 
2011. According to EIA (2015) reports, “Libya’s natural gas industry recovered in 2012, 
but production still remains below the pre-war level”. 
Before the events of 2011, Libya’s natural gas production was extremely high from 194 
Bcf in 2003 to 594 Bcf in 2010; especially, after the development of the Western Libya 
Gas Project in 2003 that accounted for most of Libya’s natural gas production growth. 
Country’s gas production was almost entirely shut for a long period in 2011, “and 
production for this year averaged around 277 Bcf, more than a 50% drop from the 
previous year” (EIA, 2015). In 2012, natural gas production recovered to 431 Bcf. 
International Oil Companies, operating in Libya, and the National Oil Company 
announced plans to increase country’s production, however that investment decisions 
are contingent on the political stability and security in the country.  
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Picture 2: Mediterranean primary energy demand by 
fuel and scenario, Source: OME  
 
Table 4: Libya’s natural gas production, Source: IEA 
     
     
      The other countries of the Mediterranean hold small amounts of natural gas but 
some of them are considered as the largest consumers of natural gas. These countries 
are Italy, France, Spain and Turkey. Turkey produces a small amount of natural gas and 
according to Oil & Gas Journal holds natural gas reserves equal to 218 Bcf (EIA, 2015). 
  
      According to future projections, 
while the demand of oil is expected to 
stabilize in the Mediterranean region, 
demand for natural gas is forecast to 
increase. North Mediterranean 
countries’ consumption rates will 
continue to trend upward with modest 
increase though. On the other hand, 
consumption in South and East 
Mediterranean countries is expected 
to experience increase by the largest margins. This trend will be mainly the result of a 
significant increase in GDP and population in these regions leading to rising electricity 
and overall gas consumption. 
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Picture 3: Mediterranean Gas Demand by Region, Source: OME, September 2016 
    
     To meet expected growth in demand, countries in the Eastern Mediterranean will 
need to produce or import additional natural gas supplies. Israel can consider as 
successful case that managed to develop its offshore natural gas field and transform its 
energy profile. Israel reduced its dependence on oil imports and achieved a high level 
of energy security for the next decades.  
      Historically, Israel had been an importer of natural gas mainly through the Arish-
Ashkelon pipeline from Egypt and a small amount from LNG imports since 2013, when 
a floating regasification terminal was installed. The recent discoveries of natural gas 
field and their gradually development are expected to meet Israel’s rising domestic 
needs, and excess natural gas resources will likely be exported. With additional 
production volumes coming online from the Tamar field since 2013, natural gas 
consumption in Israel grew significantly from an annual average of 10 million cubic 
meters in 2001 to a peak of 7.98 Bcm in 2014 (CIA, The World Factbook). The domestic 
natural gas market is projected to grow and to take a predominant role in Israel’s 
energy mix. 
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Table 5: Israel’s natural gas production and domestic supply, Source: IEA 
      
      Egypt holds vast reserves of natural gas and its international gas transport 
infrastructure system is composed by two LNG plants -located in Damietta and Idku- 
and two pipelines -the El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline and the Arab Gas Pipeline- (EIA, 
2015). “Over the last decades, natural gas consumption has soared in Eastern 
Mediterranean countries. According to OME (2011), in 1990 the regional share of 
natural has in the primary energy mix was only 5%, while in 2009 it was 27%. This 
trend is expected to further increase over the next years.” (Tagliapietra, 2013) Due to 
that increase in domestic demand, the development of Zohr field will primarily serve 
the Egyptian domestic market, since Egypt is struggling to meet its domestic demand. 
And for countries such as Israel and Cyprus that were traditional dependent on oil 
imports for almost their entire energy needs, the prospect of becoming self-reliant 
producers of natural gas for decades to come is exciting.   
     As regards Cyprus, the country does not consume any natural gas and is dependent 
on petroleum products imports. Lebanon relies also on energy imports, mainly oil 
products that account for over 90% of total primary energy demand, since natural gas 
is not part of the country’s energy mix after the suspension of Egypt’s supply through 
Arab Pipeline (EIA, 2014). Cyprus plans to utilize natural gas from Aphrodite field in 
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order to decrease its reliance on imports and boost its economy. Except of saving 
money, the country’s economy will not be that exposed to oil price fluctuations. 
Lebanon hopes also to discover significant natural gas reserves that will provide the 
country with the necessary supplies to meet increasing domestic demand and enhance 
its energy security. Subsequently, Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy and Water proposed a 
two-thirds increase of the natural gas share in country’s energy mix by 2030 (EIA, 
2013). 
     The continuous interruptions in natural gas flows in the region led many times such 
as in the period between 2010 and 2011, to decreases in consumption. In this period, 
the interruptions in flows from Egypt via the Arab pipeline and the onset of unrest in 
Syria led to a 23-percent natural gas consumption drop in the region due to shortages. 
Therefore, although the energy demand is increasing rapidly in Eastern Mediterranean, 
the future of natural gas development depends on the turn of events in Syria, political 
and economic instability; and delimitation disputes.  
     Turkey is a major natural gas consumer in Eastern Mediterranean region. Although, 
the country does not produce significant amounts of natural gas, it is considered as an 
important consumer, which is increasingly dependent on imports. Turkey’s natural gas 
consumption has increased rapidly over the past years and has reached a new high of 
1.7 Tcf in 2014 (EIA, 2015). Especially, the electricity generation that is mainly based on 
natural gas, more than doubled from 2000 to 2010. An average of 405 of natural gas 
consumption is accounted to power generation, while the remaining consumption is 
split between the residential/commercial and the industrial sector.  
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Table 6: Turkey’s natural gas production, imports and domestic supply, Source: IEA 
      
     In North Africa, Algeria’s, Libya’s domestic consumption increase steadily. For 
instance, “in 2014, Libya’s natural gas consumption was about 221 Bcf, more than half 
of what the country produced” (EIA, 2015). In the future, natural gas consumption is 
projected to rise as industrial sector growth and growing electricity consumption will 
continue to increase demand for natural gas.  
     In Europe, Italy is the third largest natural gas consumer with the majority of Italy’s 
total gas supply coming from imports.  Natural gas is used mainly for electricity 
production that one-third of it came from gas-fired power plants in 2013 (EIA, 2016). 
Whereas, after the economic crisis that hit the European Union since 2008, natural gas 
consumption declined steadily in Italy. The same trend can be observed in the case of 
Spain also, which is the seventh-largest natural gas consumer and was once considered 
as one of the fastest-growing natural gas markets in the Europe.  
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Table 7: Italy’s natural gas production, imports and domestic supply, Source: IEA 
       
     Finally, in the Balkans, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Greece are 
part of the regional gas trade, although they don’t import significant volumes. On the 
other hand, there are other Mediterranean countries such as Montenegro, Cyprus and 
Albania, that don’t have the necessary gas infrastructure and, thus, they do not 
consume gas.  
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Infrastructure 
      Infrastructure is a critical issue for the energy sector. Energy infrastructure includes 
the physical assets that are vital for serving and supporting the energy value chain 
from production to consumption, comprising services and facilities necessary for the 
economy to function and meet the needs of society.  Mainly, it is costly technical 
structures that are owned and managed by governments or by private companies. 
Often the term critical infrastructure is used for energy infrastructure in order to 
distinguish them; since if significantly damaged, they could cause serious disruptions 
or even could result in a public safety hazard.  
     “The main characteristics of energy infrastructure projects are their capital 
intensiveness, asset specificity, long-life of assets and long gestation period.” (La 
Sapienza, 2015) Mainly, energy infrastructure tends to be capital intensive, since the 
initial investment requirement is often high, and has a high degree of specificity. This 
specificity in combination with the long life of assets increase the risks and 
uncertainties about the possible costs and benefits in future. Additionally, another 
significant risk is related to time-lag between investment decisions and realization of a 
project. This requires that any investment decision should be based on a careful 
projection of future market conditions and strategies to manage them, since any 
possible changes in the business environment during the implementation of a project 
can jeopardize the investment.  
     More specifically, in the natural gas industry investment decisions require a more 
careful consideration, since investment requirements are higher infrastructure-related 
costs and initial investment costs. On the other hand, the benefits are hard to be 
identified and estimated because there is no a global gas benchmark price and gas 
producers, generally, are required to define their targeted market and find a large 
consumer who is eager and in a position to pay a remunerative price for the gas 
(Battacharyya, 2011).  
      The investment decisions rely on the cost-benefit framework. Therefore, before 
any investment decision, an economic analysis is vital in order to identify and select 
the most economically effective project by identifying and estimating the costs and 
benefits related to an investment; and comparing them. If the benefits exceed the 
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costs, the project is considered as acceptable and feasible; otherwise it is not (World 
Bank, 1996).  
 
Natural Gas & Infrastructure 
 
      For natural gas, there is a necessity of extensive infrastructure that is able to 
efficiently produce, store, and transport natural gas from producing regions to 
consume markets. Natural gas infrastructure is mainly consisted of a complex network 
of transmission, gathering and local distribution pipelines, natural gas processing, LNG 
and storage facilities (NPC North American Resource Development Study, 2011). Unlike 
crude oil or coal, natural gas needs a specific infrastructure in order to be transported 
from producing regions to the market-end users. Natural gas can be transported via 
pipelines or LNG, but pipeline is the only way to move significant quantities.  
     The most common method of gas delivery is the transmission via pipelines. 
Transmission pipelines receive gas from the midstream facilities (gathering or 
processing facilities) and deliver this gas either to end users, local distribution 
companies, or to other transmission pipelines for further downstream transportation 
(NPC North American Resource Development Study, 2011). 
     There are three major types of pipelines: gathering pipelines, interstate pipelines 
and distribution pipelines. At the regional level, transmission via pipelines is the most 
appropriate choice, since it is easy technologically and more competitive in economic 
terms. However, according to Matteo Verda (2015), “pipeline transport entails two 
main limitations; the first is the dramatic increase in cost for long distances, especially 
when offshore sections are required” and “another limit is represented by the strong 
interdependence between exporter and importer that a pipeline entails: in the case of 
a problem upstream, the consumer cannot use the pipeline to import gas from other 
resources.” 
     There is no typical pipeline as far as cost is concerned; construction costs depend on 
geographical area, size of pipeline, location, on or offshore, number and size of pump 
stations or compressor stations and related facilities, and general economic conditions 
(Kennedy, 1993). Generally, costs for an offshore pipeline are significantly higher than 
for a pipeline on land.  
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     The cost of building pipelines can be significant, and an infrastructure project must 
be assessed as feasible and economically favorable before the final decision given the 
realities of the economic and social environment in which it will operate. “Therefore, 
“transporting” natural gas through the pipeline must generate sufficient revenue 
during its operating lifetime in order to justify the upfront capital investment.” (U.S. 
Department for Energy, 2015) Revenue from pipelines mainly depends on the demand 
for natural gas and natural gas prices. Natural gas demand is highly seasonal, however 
during peak periods or due to transmission disruptions gas prices could spike.  
     “Because pipelines are not moved once they built, new pipelines or modifications to 
existing pipelines are required when production in a supply basin grows and reaches 
pipeline takeaway capacity constraints out of the region, or when demand in a market 
area grows to exceed the pipeline system capacity to deliver into the region.” (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2015) Therefore, the development of new natural gas pipelines 
is determined by the market fundamentals of supply and demand; and natural gas 
price differentials between two locations or “hubs”.  
     Additionally, due to the current general political instability and the insecurity that 
gives to the pipelines, LNG became a resilient way of delivering mobile gas, that can 
provide the fuel to a greater number of markets (Saleem, 2014) and especially distant 
markets, whose access through pipelines is uneconomical and not commercially-viable. 
In this process, gas is cooled and liquefied at -162 centigrade at atmospheric pressure, 
occupies only 1/600th of its original volume when it is in liquefied form, and can be 
transported via special tanks. Regarding the quality of gas from LNG, “may be superior 
to piped gas in terms of energy provided on combustion since impurities are often 
removed during the processing of LNG.” (Saleem, 2014).  
     As weaknesses of LNG, we can consider the high cost of such projects especially 
regarding the development of liquefaction plants, specially designed ships, 
regasification terminals; and the rise of piracy on high seas. In the past, LNG tankers 
were constructed in line with the specific characteristics of each project and were 
designed only for specific LNG receiving terminals. But the creation of a global LNG 
market mainly due to spot trading required more efficient and safer operation of LNG 
tankers, a fact that increased the cost. However, nowadays the main disadvantage is 
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the low oil prices that create a risk of postponing or even cancelling investments in 
new LNG export projects.   
      Rational economic behavior and perfect foresight on future demand and prices are 
two prerequisites for a successful investment. But a variety of barriers may lead to 
outcomes that differ from those expected by previous analyses and studies, since it is 
extremely difficult to anticipate credible the potential future market disequilibrium 
between supply and demand.  
     Increased natural gas demand may intensify the need for high-deliverability storage 
mainly for the natural gas electric power generators. Storage facilities are located close 
to both production and market areas and they are subjected generally to geological 
limitations and market forces. Three types of underground storage facilities exist: 
depleted oil/gas reservoirs, salt caverns and aquifers; and the finding of such sites with 
the combination of specific characteristics such as geological features, pipeline 
proximity, and the ability to obtain land, rights and permitting; is extremely 
challenging. These facilities are designed to meet demand peaks and possible supply 
disruptions.  “Storage helps mitigate pipeline imbalance charges and daily and 
seasonal price volatility.” (European Commission, 2015) Additionally, in cases when 
production of natural gas is in excess of demand, storage allows producers to continue 
production without interruptions that could permanently pose a risk to wells’ integrity. 
There are three types of underground storage facilities: depleted oil/gas reservoirs, 
salt caverns, and aquifers. Lack of access to storage can dramatically lead to increased 
price volatility, thereby many states oblige national or international companies to 
construct storage facilities in order to enhance security of supply and offer a physical 
tool for handing any imbalances may occur.  
 
Infrastructure in the Mediterranean Region 
 
I. Pipelines in the Mediterranean  
Gas trade in the Mediterranean region separates the region into three corridors or 
three trade zones: Western, Eastern and Central Mediterranean. The Western gas 
trade zone is stretching from Algeria to Portugal and France via Spain. In the Central 
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Mediterranean zone, it is Italy, a transit and consumer country, which is 
interconnected to Balkan countries. However, the situation is not the same for the 
Eastern Mediterranean zone, which is less interconnected than the others. In this 
region, Egypt was considered to be the main exporter until 2015, with a pipeline route 
to Syria, Jordan and Israel. Turkey is becoming also a significant transit country, that 
has the potential to be transformed into an energy hub in the region. 
Picture 4: Natural Gas Infrastructure in the Mediterranean, Source: European Commission, 2015 
     In the Western Mediterranean, there is a regional gas market among Algeria, 
Morocco, Spain, France and Portugal. Algeria is a major supplier of LNG and pipeline 
gas to Morocco and southern Europe. However, according to Darbouche (2011) “a 
combination of subdued upstream gas development and growing domestic 
consumption has left the prospects of Algerian gas exports in a worse position than 
initially intended”.  
      Algerian gas is transported to Spain via two submarine pipelines. The oldest one is 
the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline that came online in 1996, has a capacity of 11.5 Bcm 
per year and runs 1,620 kilometers from Algeria to Spain via Morocco. The latest 
project between Algeria and Spain, MEDGAZ inaugurated on 1 March 2011 and is 
stretching 210 Km onshore and offshore with a capacity of 8 bcm per year.  The deep-
water gas pipeline begins from Beni Saf on the Algerian coast to Almeria in Andalusia. 
Then the Spanish network forwards the remaining Algerian gas to Portugal and France.  
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     The Spanish system is interconnected with Portugal via the Tuy and Badajoz 
pipelines; and via the Irun and Larrau with France. However, due to their limited 
capacities, from 0,1 to 4,2 Bcm, the penetration of Algerian gas in Portugal, France and 
other European countries’ energy markets is extremely restricted. Except of the 
existing interconnections, there are other two proposed interconnection projects.  The 
first one “Val de Frades” project, a 162-km length pipeline is supposed to come online 
in 2019 and will have a bidirectional flow with a capacity of of 2,36 Bcm per year from 
Spain to Portugal and 1,67 Bcm from Portugal to Spain. The second one is the Midcat 
project, a 25-km long pipeline that will connect Spain and France from 2020 and 
onwards; and will have a capacity of 2,5 Bcm per year from France to Spain and 7.3 
Bcm per year from Spain to Algeria (MedReg, 2015). Supplementary to the new 
interconnections that will boost natural gas import-export capacity and foster energy 
trade in the region, increase in the capacity of existing interconnections is also a crucial 
issue regarding the development and success of the regional natural gas market. 
     Regarding the Central-Mediterranean part, there are two major gas suppliers 
Algeria and Libya; and one main consumer Italy. The most significant interconnection 
of the central Mediterranean is the Trans-med/ Enrico Mattei, a 2,475 kilometers long 
pipeline, which became operational in 1983 and has a capacity of more than 33.5 Bcf 
per year. Trans-med pipeline stretches from Algeria to Italy through Tunisia with an 
extension to Slovenian borders.  
     The second important subsea interconnection in the region, is the Green Stream 
pipeline that begins from the the onshore Wafa Field and the offshore Bouri Field and 
reaches Gela in Sicily. From Gela, the natural gas flows onward to the Italian mainland. 
The pipeline came online in 2004 and runs 520 kilometers with an annual capacity of 
11 Bcm. Because of the political unrest that hit Libya in 2011, the Green Stream 
pipeline was shut down, but reopened shortly after. Northern Europe and Russia are 
also major natural gas suppliers of Italy via interconnections with Austria and 
Switzerland.  
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Gas 
Pipeline 
Route  Operator Length Capacity Completion 
      
Trans-Med 
/Enrico Mattei 
Algeria-
Tunisia-
Italy 
Sonatrach- Eni  2,475 
km 
33.5 Bcm/y 1983 
Maghreb-
Europe 
Algeria-
Morocco-
Spain-
Portugal 
Sonatrach- 
Kingdom of 
Morocco- 
Enagas- Transgas 
1,620 km 11.5 Bcm/y 1996 
Medgaz Algeria-
Spain 
Sonatrach- 
Cepsa- 
Iberdrola- 
Endessa- GDF 
Suez 
757 km 8 Bcm/y 2010 
Greenstream  Libya-Italy Eni- National Oil 
Corporation 
520 km 11 Bcm/y 2004 
Arab Gas 
Pipeline 
Egypt-
Jordan-
Syria-
Lebanon 
Egas- ENPPI- 
Petroget- Gasco- 
SPC 
1,200 km 10.3 Bcm/y 2003 
Arish-
Ashkelon 
Egypt-
Israel 
Egyptian General 
Petroleum 
Corporation- 
EMI-EGI LP- 
Merhav- 
Mediterranean 
Gas Pipeline- 
PTT 
100 km 7 Bcm/y 2008 
Table 9: Most important natural gas pipelines in the Mediterranean Region. 
       
      In the Balkans, Slovenia and Croatia have formed a kind of gas trade, since Slovenia 
is interconnected with Italy with a bidirectional pipeline and Croatia, in turn, is 
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connected to the Slovenian network. On the other hand, Bosnia & Herzegovina is not a 
part of this trade scheme, but relies heavily on Russian gas imports. Finally, the other 
two Balkan countries, Montenegro and Albania don’t possess the necessary gas 
infrastructure, and consequently, natural gas is not part of their energy mix.  
     “Various ongoing projects have the potential of diversifying trade routes and 
sources and introduce natural gas to non-gas consuming countries through the 
region.” (MedReg, 2015) In Italy, the Galsi project (Gasdotto Algeria- Sardegna Italia) 
will strengthen country’s central position and will allow the penetration of Algerian gas 
to the Sardinia Island. The proposed pipeline will run 861 km long with an annual 
capacity of 8 Bcm through a direct flow. 
     In the Balkans, two other significant subsea pipeline projects are under 
construction. The first one, the Trans-Adriatic (TAP) project, whose construction 
started in 2016 will have a capacity of 10-20 Bcm per year and will transport Azeri gas 
to Europe. The 870 km-long pipeline is expected to come online in 2020 provided that 
the Shah Deniz II. field and the TANAP projects will simultaneously develop. The IGI-
Poseidon is an offshore pipeline that will connect Greece with Italy. The pipeline is 
supposed to transport approximately 10-14 Bcm of natural gas per year coming 
through Turkey via the ITGI pipeline from the Caspian, East Mediterranean and Middle 
East. Taking into consideration these three projects, Galsi, TAP and IGI-Poseidon, Italy 
has the potential to become a Central Mediterranean gas hub by 2020.  
     The natural gas market in the Eastern Mediterranean part is highly fragmented. 
There are two main gas markets, those of Egypt and Turkey, which are not 
interconnected. Turkey is the most well-interconnected country in the region, as it 
receives gas supplies from Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia; and imports LNG gas from 2 
different entry points. However, Turkey’s exit capacity is limited, as it has only one 
export point to Greece with limited capacity of gas flow (MedReg, 2015).  
     Egypt is considered the main natural gas supplier in the Eastern Mediterranean 
through the Arab Gas Pipeline that starts from Egypt, passes through Jordan, Syria and 
ends in Lebanon. In 2008, an extension of AGP was built in order to transport Egyptian 
gas to Ashkelon in Israel. Until now, the lack of alternative sources and limited 
interconnections set a barrier to the formation of regional gas market in Eastern 
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Mediterranean. However, the recent natural gas discoveries have the potential to 
transform the region.  
     An essential step towards the creation of regional gas market in the Eastern 
Mediterranean would be completion of the Arab Gas pipeline by connecting Syria with 
Turkey. Thereby, Egyptian gas will enter Turkey’s natural gas market, while regional 
countries will be able to import gas available in Turkey coming from other regions such 
as Russia or Caspian. Unfortunately, due to the ongoing civil war in Syria this project is 
impossible.  
     In Turkey, the most important under-construction investment projects are the 
TANAP and the Iraqi interconnection. TANAP is scheduled to transport gas from the 
Shah Deniz II. and connect to the TAP in order to bring Azeri natural gas to Europe.  
     As a game changer in the region is considered the recent gas discoveries in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. These offshore sources have the potential to transform the 
energy outlook of the region since their development will enable some countries like 
Egypt, Cyprus and Israel to have their own indigenous production and even to 
generate extra revenue from exports. 
     Several investment options for gas exports were proposed, including a pipeline to 
Greece or Turkey and LNG terminals in Cyprus, Egypt or Israel. However, most of them 
are running economic or technical difficulties and the most developed one until now is 
a pipeline from Israel to Jordan, which is scheduled to come online later this year.  
     “The Mediterranean energy sector has a high degree of interdependence, both for 
electricity and gas” mainly in the Western and Central Mediterranean that possess 
sufficient cross-border interconnections (MedReg, 2015). Therefore, close ties and 
adequate infrastructure are necessary in order to guarantee security of supply in the 
region.   
     On the other hand, in Eastern Mediterranean, interconnections are limited and not 
sufficient to guarantee the formation of an integrated regional gas market. In the near 
future, though, there are projections that due to energy security uncertainties and the 
crucial need for supply diversification electricity and gas interconnections will improve 
along the East corridor paving the way for the creation of a successful regional energy 
market.   
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II. LNG Facilities in Mediterranean  
     Algeria has four LNG units at Arzew and Skikda with an annual design capacity of 44 
Bcm. The country was the world’s first LNG producer in 1964 and as for 2014, was “the 
world’s seventh-largest exporter of LNG, exporting about 5% of the world’s total 
exports.” (EIA, 2016)      
     LNG terminal projects have the ability to foster gas trade in Western 
Mediterranean. On the demand side, France is constructing a new LNG terminal, the 
Fos Faster terminal with an annual capacity of 18,25 Bcm; while it upgrades the 
capacity of Dunkirk and Fos Cavaou terminals. Spain, also, started the capacity upgrade 
of its LNG terminal on the Northern Coast. These three projects only, is expected to 
bring an additional capacity of 22 Bcm of natural gas per year to the West 
Mediterranean energy market (MedReg, 2015). On the supply side, Algeria is 
upgrading the capacity of its Arzew terminal, which will have an additional liquefaction 
capacity of 6 Bcm per year.  
     In the Mediterranean, there are liquefaction plants in Algeria, Egypt and Libya; and 
several regasification plants in Spain (Huelva, Cartagena, Barcelona), France (Fos, 
Montoir de Bretagne, and soon, Dunkirk), Italy (Panigaglia, Rovigo and Livorno), Greece 
(Revithousa) and Turkey (Marmara, Ereglisi), (MedReg, 2015) 
     Nowadays, Italy has been involved in a great number of LNG projects with six 
different LNG regasification terminals. The country aspires to bring additional 49 Bcm 
of natural gas per year to the Italian LNG network in order to lower energy costs. 
Finally, Malta’s LNG terminal in Marsaxlokk Bay became operative in January, when it 
received the first cargo of LNG that transformed the country into a new natural gas 
consumer in the region. 
     In the region, there are only a few countries that possess the desired characteristics 
in order to serve as a regional gas hub, notably France, Italy and Spain. Greece and 
Turkey have expressed also their interest, however they both face serious political, 
commercial and logistical problems that constitute their transformation into energy 
hubs almost impossible. In addition, according to Oxford Institute (2015) “it is more 
feasible that South-eastern Europe will have gas priced at a differential (i.e. higher) to 
that of the other regional hubs, such as Italy, central Europe and even eastern Europe 
due to lack of competition”. Competition is an important indicator driving the 
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development of the market and its success, since it indicates the willingness of the 
traders to choose the specific hub and, also, how easy it is for them to participate and 
trade on this platform.  
      As regards the infrastructure perspective the creation of a regional hub requires 
the establishment of a robust interconnection system, LNG terminals and storage 
facilities. But, under the current low prices and other uncertainties in the energy 
market, it is projected that the selection of projects will be based mainly on quick and 
healthy paybacks. The Eastern Mediterranean’s transformation into an energy hub, 
since the region doesn’t possess inadequate infrastructure, should start with initial 
export targets that will be local, flexible and commercially viable; and will not pose 
high risks.  
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Energy Geopolitics 
   
     Geopolitics is the battle for space and power played out in a geographical setting 
(Kaplan, 2014). Cohen (1973) argues that “geopolitical studies the relations between 
international politics and the geographical base (space), on which these politics is 
carried out”. According to Leigh (2014) “Traditionally ‘geopolitics’ is founded on the 
view that international political developments can be explained or predicted by 
reference to geographic variables. These include the location and size of a country, its 
population, resources, and degree of technological development. In its classic form, 
geopolitics is a deterministic theory in which some combination of these variables 
produces political outcomes.” (Leigh, 2014) The Geopolitics of energy, specifically, 
investigates and analyses the interaction between energy, security and international 
relations by observing how energy markets shape international politics and vice versa. 
Since both are not static, developments in the energy markets are changing the 
geopolitical landscape that strongly correlates with the national security interests of all 
countries. Conversely, political decisions lead to changes in the energy markets and 
global consumers. The main aim of this subfield is to provide knowledge for the 
conduct of state policy and provide ways of addressing and averting energy security 
risks.  
     Nation states are the principal actors in the geopolitics of energy, which possess 
power and authority to promote self-defined national interests. Central to this 
tradition is the geopolitical struggle for natural resources. Modern industrial societies 
are heavily dependent on cheap and abundant fossil fuels for providing the energy 
essential for modern living and economic growth. As Shaffer (2009) supports “a 
country’s ability to access energy supplies and the way in which it uses energy crucially 
determine the state of its economy, its national security, and the quality and 
sustainability of its environment”.  Natural resources have long gained a strategic 
importance; have shaped the international arena by determining great powers, 
alliances and outcomes of wars; and have feed geopolitical anxieties.  “Whereas the 
Age of Coal and Steam was the backdrop for the British Empire in the 18th and 
19thcenturies, the Age of Petroleum has been the backdrop for the American Empire 
from the end of the 19th to the early 21st centuries.” (Kaplan, 2014) Except of financing 
  -35- 
wars, natural resources have been considered as an important motive behind several 
wars and conflicts such as the Gulf wars of 1990-1 and 2003; while also being the focus 
of inter-state rivalry and strategic denial of access. Michael Klare (cited in Scholvin, 
2016), that employs supply, demand and some characteristics of resources in order to 
explain conflicts among states, argues that “national power in the 21st century is 
determined by the vastness of a country’s resources and its ability to generate other 
sources of wealth to purchase resources”. Meanwhile, resources are presenting high 
geographic concentration and uneven distribution underneath a comparatively small 
area of the world’s surface (Task force 3, 2012). Clearly, access to energy resources is a 
major determinant of international developments and because of their “territorial” 
character; they usually generate more territorial stakes than any other economic 
sector and could affect political stability in both exporting and importing states.  
Finally, the political environment in which decision on the use of resources are taken is 
also an important factor that should be taken under consideration and research.  
     Except of the control of resources, control of commodity networks and trading 
routes is also a prerequisite in order to achieve an effective exploitation of them and 
their advantages. Such advantages are large financial rents coming from the control of 
resources and provide a crucial link between the economy and politics that differs 
from country to country based on the institutional context in which they are exploited. 
That becomes more apparent in the case of natural gas, where pipelines crossing 
regional or sub-regional borders, a fact that indicates the need of a diplomatic 
approach rather than a merely economic one. As Kandiyoti (2008) points out, “the vital 
nature of fuel transmission ranks among key geopolitical elements that now regulate 
relations between states.” And continues that “it is also important to keep an eye on 
hydrocarbon transmission through international pipelines that may be prevented from 
functioning in case of conflict or disagreement.” Thus, states choose routes to export 
or import energy commodities according to their interests by examining and taking 
into consideration the different ramifications of various route options. 
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Most Common Geopolitical Risks 
     States that possess energy resources used to employ a strategic behavior to 
promote their national interests and better position themselves in the international 
arena. That becomes evident in many cases, where states driving by geopolitical 
competition sacrifice the potential of capturing economic rents from companies along 
the natural gas chain value; and implement policies that are geopolitical rather than 
economic (Task force 3, 2012).  As Mackinder (1904) notes geopolitics is “the usage of 
territorial determined comparative advantages in the balance of power between 
states”. 
     On the other hand, energy is an important good for all the states that need it to 
function. Thus, the geopolitical interests of all states are affected by the developments 
in energy sector; and countries with demand-driven economies for energy resources 
play an important role and have the capacity to intervene in the energy markets. 
Recently, a structural shift from the dominance of suppliers to consumers is evident 
due to the gas oversupply and the growth of LNG trade. Oversupply and supply 
diversification favor consumers, that are considering now as key players in the 
international gas markets (Task Force Report, 2013).  
     The uneven distribution of resources generally has two consequences; it can foster 
more robust ties and cooperation between states due to economic interdependence 
or can generate conflicts. Additionally, countries’ foreign and domestic policies play a 
crucial role in whether a number of gas projects are realized and come online 
especially as regards pipelines, since they can put in risk huge investments.  
     Nowadays the greatest geopolitical issue that poses a serious and existential threat 
to all national states is the climate change. This challenge in order to be tackled 
successfully requires cooperation from all parts and commitment.   
 
The Geopolitical Context in the Mediterranean Region 
     Mediterranean is considered a region that displays a great diversity in terms of 
population, languages, religions and economic growth; and a big part of it can 
characterized as a crisis-ridden region, prone to conflict and fraught with complex 
geopolitics. Nowadays, Mediterranean has become more dangerous and political 
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unstable due to a series of conflicts; the “Arab Spring”, the strong presence of Sunni 
extremist groups, the sectarian war between Sunni and Shia; and a lagging economy in 
Europe. Another destabilizing factor in the region is the terrorist group known as the 
ISIS that has taken over several Iraqi and Syrian cities, and threatens to spread 
terrorism in Middle East through its network. Additionally, the still-unresolved 
Palestine problem, and the dispute between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus 
impede the creation of a reliable natural gas hub in the region. The creation of a 
Mediterranean gas hub could act as a key source and route for supplying gas to Europe 
or more distant markets and would present great benefits for all players in the region 
strategically and economically. Until now, “proposals for pipelines and LNG schemes 
have emerged, they all face problems related to economics or international relations—
or both.” Furthermore, “there are other substantial hurdles to overcome, including 
lack of pricing transparency, as well as market culture and attitude to gas trading” 
(Tagliapietra, 2013).    
      The major conflicts in the region are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the division of 
Cyprus, the civil war in Syria and the ongoing conflict between rival groups in Libya. 
Although, some of these disputes have lasted for decades and posed significant 
challenges to national and regional politics; the Syrian conflict is the most prominent 
nowadays, that threatens to redraw the region’s interstate boundaries.  
     The Mediterranean, mainly the Eastern part, has become a hotspot for the oil & gas 
industry after a series of giant natural gas discoveries in Israel, Cyprus and Egypt since 
2009; leading many analysts to consider the region and its vast natural gas resources 
as a “geopolitical game changer” (Leigh, 2014) that has the potential to transform the 
region and global energy markets. The transformation of Eastern Mediterranean to a 
natural gas province will inevitably alter the geopolitical landscape, thus creating new 
opportunities and challenges for each player in the region. These three countries have 
the potential to create a new natural gas basin, whose exports can enhance the 
region’s role in the global energy landscape, strengthen energy cooperation in the 
region and pave the way for a new era of political and economic stability in the region.   
     Egypt hopes to become a center of regional natural gas development, but the 
country has been struggling the last years to balance rapidly growing domestic demand 
due to increased population growth and natural gas subsidies that keep natural gas 
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prices low. Although, the majority of new discoveries in Egypt are going to be 
consumed domestically, Egypt has the infrastructure needed for exports and a massive 
consumer market; two characteristics that made it a vital partner for the development 
of region’s natural gas sector.  
     On the other hand, the large discoveries in Cypriot and Israeli territorial waters can 
transform the countries from importers to self-reliant producers of natural gas; and 
can present a supply for adjacent markets by monetizing further resources through 
exports. The water depth at the field locations though, increases the costs for their 
development. Additionally, decisions on natural gas export projects in the 
Mediterranean are especially likely to be affected by political considerations. Regional 
geopolitics is the factor that will ultimately determine the development of the region, 
which has a long history of strained relations. “The lack of agreement on maritime 
borders and the relatively immature state of development of their energy policies 
make investment in this region riskier.” (Darbouche, 2012) 
     Israel hoped to export natural gas to Egypt and improve its relationships with 
neighbor countries such as Egypt and Jordan. Noble made a non-binding agreement 
with Dutch/Shell to send 7 Bcm every year, for 15 years to the LNG facility at Idku, 
since the existing Arab Pipeline has only one-way flow and negotiations about its 
reversion have hit a snag. However, the giant discovery of the Zohr field by ENI 
thwarted these plans.  
     Recently, energy has played role contributing to the improvement of bilateral 
relations between Greece and Israel after their convergence of their interests in major 
areas and mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean. The prospect of development of 
Eastern Mediterranean resources has brought also Cyprus and Israel together. 
Although, these three countries didn’t have a dispute, the Greek and Cypriot stance 
was always pro-Arabic, while the Israelis were close allies with Turkey until the Mavi 
Marmara incidence when their diplomatic ties were disrupted. However, in June 2016 
Israel and Turkey have finalized a deal to end the six-year diplomatic rift and paved the 
way for a possible major natural gas deal since Turkish companies expressed interest in 
Israeli gas. Right after, Cyprus Energy Minister Georgios Lakkotrypis, and Egypt’s 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Tarek El Molla signed a deal on 31st of 
August 2016 paving the way for further negotiations on a submarine pipeline from 
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Cyprus’ offshore fields to Egypt in order to be used either for domestic consumption or 
re-export to energy-starved neighbors such as Jordan (Offshore Energy Today Staff, 
2016).  
     Athens, Jerusalem and Cyprus share significant energy interests; and they are 
committed to implement the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of Sea to facilitate the 
exploration and exploitation of the seabed. In contrast, “Ankara has not signed on to 
UNCLOS and favors a settlement in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean that 
would take perceived Turkish interests into greater account” (Karagiannis, 2016). The 
strengthening of ties with these countries created a new geopolitical bloc in the 
region. In this light, the cooperation of those 3 countries and their shared interests 
make Athens to announce in 2014 an international tender for the preparation of a 
feasibility study of an Eastern Mediterranean pipeline that will carry Israeli and Cypriot 
gas to Europe via Crete and the Greek mainland. Later, the European Commission has 
included the proposed pipeline in its list of “projects of Common Interests” that could 
receive financial support by the EU. Greece has as an ultimate goal to assume the role 
of a regional natural gas hub and act as a gateway to South East Europe, however, the 
domestic economic instability and the lack of inadequate infrastructure such as 
storage facilities work against this aspiration. According to some analysts, “the plans 
and ambitions of small and problematic players such as Greece will easily be 
smashed.” (Stambolis, n.d.) 
     On the other hand, Turkey initiated recently the formalization of its diplomatic 
relations with Russian and Israel based on a specific interest, namely energy. Turkey 
aspires and has the potential to enhance its role in the region as an important energy 
player that constitutes a transit country between the East-West and the South-North 
axes. Turkey believes in the creation of a natural gas basin in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and supports the construction of a pipeline that will transport Israeli 
gas to Europe through Turkey; since geopolitical tensions between Cyprus and Turkey 
constitute the creation of a pipeline between those two countries unlikely. The 
construction of a pipeline passing through Turkey will enhance its strategic importance 
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as a transit country, will satisfy its energy needs1 and promotes its policy of becoming a 
natural gas hub.  In the same time a pipeline transporting gas to Europe will contribute 
to continent’s energy security and diversification process. This project has cost-benefit 
advantages and is considered economically and technologically feasible, in contrast 
with the proposed East-Med pipeline that runs into technical difficulties due to the 
seabed between Cyprus and the Greek coast; and very high costs. But first, Turkey has 
to adapt its natural gas market laws in compliance with the principles of free market 
competition and liberal pricing policies; and, in the same time, has to upgrade its LNG 
and storage capacity.   
     From 2012, Syria has seen the total suspension of activities involving the 
exploitation of oil and gas fields following the conquest of the country’s main wells by 
the Islamic State. Energy companies, active in the country, forced to abandon Syria 
with the imposition of international sanction in 2012 (EIA, 2015).  
     Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, on the other hand, due to the enduring political 
instability have long been risky operating environments for oil and gas operations, 
since regional physical assets and personnel have been targeted -mainly by terrorist 
organizations- and come under threat. These incidents have made investment 
decisions in the region extremely difficult for energy companies because these specific 
infrastructures are extremely costly and highly distributed, some of them in remote 
areas constituting their protection difficult.  
      Sectarianism has become, nowadays, the biggest threat to region’s stability. A 
sectarian strife between Sunni and Shi’a- a war ranging across Lebanon and Syria- 
desires to revive the structure of the regional order.  These clashes and proxy wars 
have elevated concerns about infrastructure vulnerability and other subsequent 
political risks. 
     Albeit commercial appeal, the creation of an integrated Mediterranean gas hub will 
depend not only on foreign policy considerations but, also, on domestic policies. “Even 
in Israel, investors have faced difficulties. Energy security is a sensitive topic in a 
country that sees itself as a politically isolated in the region. Many Israelis are uneasy 
                                                 
1 The Turkish economy is dependent on fossil fuel imports. The main denominators of Turkish energy 
consumption are coil, oil and natural gas. However, except of coal that is domestically available in 
significant amounts, the other two are coming mainly through imports.  
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about the country exporting its natural wealth.” (Nakhle, 2016) As for Egypt, the 
government’s policy to divert natural gas supply for exports to meet demand, the low 
prices that the government is willing to pay to foreign operators and the inability of 
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGCP) to pay off its debts to foreign 
operators lead to investment delays and accelerate investors’ anxiety (EIA, 2015). 
Except of the aforementioned, “the declining oil and gas prices has amplified the 
difficulties in the region and brought into question whether developing the fields is 
commercially viable.” (Nakhle, 2016)   
     Egypt appears to have the largest offshore capacity in the region, yet most of its 
production will probably be exploited and commercialized in the domestic market. 
Egypt is the only country in the region that possesses the required infrastructure and 
can commercialize its production through exports mainly in the form of LNG from its 
LNG terminals at Idku and Damietta. Also, Egypt could use the Arab Pipeline; however 
due to the Syrian civil war, the terrorization of the Sinai region and gas developments 
in Israeli, LNG provides country with access to more distant and better-positioned 
markets. Egypt’s LNG exports dropped from a starting level of about 15 bcm/y in 2005 
to almost zero in 2014, leaving the country’s two LNG plants completely idle 
(Tagliapietra & Zachmann, 2013). In addition, the proximity of the three fields Zohr, 
Aphrodite and Leviathan, allows the development of the fields to be coordinated by 
bringing Israeli and Cypriot gas to the Egyptian underused LNG Terminals -both 
terminals can be expanded and provide a flexible outlet. This solution, according to 
many analysts, is the most prominent and sensible option that minimizes political and 
especially commercial risk, for instance if the field underperforms. “Consequently, 
bringing together an underused and scalable export infrastructure with several 
promising fields could be the key to unlock untapped regional potential.” (Tagliapietra 
& Zachmann, 2013)    
     Lebanon although there are serious indications that possess vast natural gas 
reserves, had been stuck in a political stalemate since May 2014, when the parliament 
failed to elect a new president after the end of Michel Sleiman’s term; until recently in  
October, when General Aoun managed to secure the support of enough parties. This 
political stalemate has halted for years the country’s once-hopeful energy potentials 
and dented investor confidence. 
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A Mediterranean Natural Gas Hub 
     “The politics and economics of Mediterranean energy are rapidly changing. The 
resources could reshape local domestic economies, frame regional geopolitics and 
provide an alternative source of gas to Europe, reducing its dependence on Russia” 
(Nakhle, 2016).  Local economies can reap big economic benefits, once gas become 
commercial. Regional players from their part should strengthen the energy 
cooperation, which can also pave the way for a new era of economic and political 
stability in the Mediterranean.  The combined resources of Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel 
and Cyprus advocate the creation of a natural gas hub in the Mediterranean. For the 
creation of a gas hub in the Mediterranean, establishment of a robust interconnection 
system, LNG terminals and storage facilities is a prerequisite. But considering the 
capital intensity of such infrastructure projects, the current pricing and the political 
dynamics in the region create serious challenges for such immense investments. 
Specifically, the Eastern Mediterranean region in order to develop its energy sector 
economically and physically, first has to resolve crucial political constrains, long-
standing disputes, regular corruption incidents and governance issues.  
     Therefore, countries should engage diplomatically and cooperate towards the 
creation of the appropriate infrastructure. For instance, the strategic alignment 
between Cyprus, Greece and Israel represents a new element in the regional 
geopolitical landscape. On the other hand, “absent of collaborative vision could 
represent a potential element of destabilization in the region and also a source of new 
tensions with Turkey” since the creation of this energy axis is opposed to Turkey’s 
objective of becoming a regional natural gas hub.   
     For this role, Italy is considered one of the most prominent actors in the region to 
assume a leading role in this project with the support of the European Union that 
desires to create a Mediterranean gas hub in the South of Europe in order to diversify 
its energy supplies and routes. In order this project to complete successfully, it 
requires strong cooperation between European countries, increase of interconnectors  
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and a strong diversification policy that could trigger infrastructure investments from 
Africa and the Middle East moving away from their traditional major supplier Russia.  
       Finally, regarding infrastructure, the creation of an energy hub in the region 
requires vast investment in regasification terminals, storage facilities, pipelines and 
shipping vessels. Except of the physical market, countries must adopt their energy laws 
in compliance with market rules such as third party access, removal of destination 
clauses and the unbundling of companies that trade gas, operate pipelines or LNG 
terminals; and distribute gas to consumers.  
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Conclusions 
      
     Today new resources create new geopolitical opportunities and challenges, and as 
climate issues move to the fore of the global agenda the situation is becoming more 
complicating for policy makers and the industry.  Therefore, there is a growing need 
for countries to engage in international cooperation in order to deal successfully with 
energy issues and tackle subsequent security challenges. “Political will is needed to 
resolve conflicts and to bring about strategic realignments.” (Leigh, 2014).   
       In the Mediterranean region, the energy sector generally indicates imbalances 
since some countries for instance Algeria, Libya and Egypt hold vast fossil fuel reserves; 
while others mainly in the North part of Mediterranean are the largest consumers of 
natural gas (i.e. Italy and France). Except of the previous, there are also countries in 
the region that do not use natural gas as fuel such as Albania, Cyprus and Lebanon. 
Therefore, the region has “the potential to become the marketplace where two 
significant amounts of supply and demand meet” (MedReg, 2015). However, 
geopolitical or environmental drivers are likely to play a critical role in the pace of gas 
development and substitution in power and transportation if a transformation is to 
occur in the region.  
     The combined resources of Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Algeria and Libya advocate the 
creation of a natural gas hub in the Mediterranean. For the creation of a gas hub in the 
Mediterranean, establishment of a robust interconnection system, LNG terminals and 
storage facilities is a prerequisite. But considering the capital intensity of such 
infrastructure projects, the current pricing and the political dynamics in the region 
create serious challenges for such immense investments. Therefore, countries should 
engage diplomatically and cooperate towards the creation of the appropriate 
infrastructure.       
     As a result, the resources could reshape local domestic economies, frame regional 
geopolitics and provide an alternative source of gas to Europe, reducing its 
dependence on Russia” (Nakhle, 2016). Regional players from their part should 
support energy cooperation, which can also pave the way for a new era of economic 
and political stability in the Mediterranean.      
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     However, the development of an energy hub is not an easy task and requires time 
and strong commitments of governments, suppliers and system operators. It requires, 
also, inadequate infrastructure and significant levels of capital investment, which is 
affected by the fluctuating levels of supply and demand, two indicators that produce 
prices signals that elicit a subsequent infrastructure investment response. This requires 
that any investment decision should be based on a careful projection of future market 
conditions and strategies to manage them, since any possible changes in the business 
environment during the implementation of a project can jeopardize the investment. 
Future anticipations are extremely difficult to be made, since disruptive technologies, 
policies, disasters, conflicts and environmental concerns can impact market 
uncertainty and alter dramatically the supply and demand projections; and only if 
existing infrastructure is effectively used the level of investment could be lower.  
     The Mediterranean region has the potential to transform into an important natural 
gas hub and towards this direction the Mediterranean countries should support trade, 
encourage new market players to participate and develop the adequate infrastructure. 
Except of the infrastructure task, it is crucial that the regional gas markets should 
follow the rules of the market; and should develop a liquidity and hub-based structure 
that will be transparent and will ensure fair access to all participants without 
discrimination, if they fulfil the appropriate industrial and economical standards. 
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